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Abstract—This paper proposes an initial architecture for
a Space Traffic Management (STM) system, based on open
Application Programming Interfaces (APIs) and drawing on
previous work by NASA to develop an architecture for low-
altitude Unmanned Aerial System Traffic Management (UTM).
The authors explore how autonomy could be used to enhance an
STM system, and how constraints inherent in STM complicate
and challenge certain applications of autonomy. We conceptually
explore how autonomy could be used within an STM architecture,
with multiple non-authoritative catalogs of resident space objects,
and to determine which of two spacecraft moves to prevent an
impending conjunction between them. NASA Ames Research
Center (ARC) is developing a software research environment for
STM, along with a physical laboratory and visualization space.
We invite STM stakeholders to collaborate in our infrastructure,
to help inform the design of the proposed STM architecture, and
to participate in the refinement and validation of its concept of
operations using the software research platform.
Index Terms—Space Traffic Management, Collision Avoidance,
Space Situational Awareness, Autonomy, Space Policy
I. INTRODUCTION
As ever larger numbers of spacecraft seek to make use of
Earth’s limited orbital volume in increasingly dense orbital
regimes, greater coordination will become necessary to ensure
these spacecraft are able to operate safely while avoiding
physical collisions, radio-frequency interference, and other
hazards. While efforts to date have focused on improving space
situational awareness (SSA) and enabling operator to operator
coordination, there is growing recognition that a broader
system for space traffic management (STM) is necessary. In
June 2018, President Trump signed Space Policy Directive 3,
ordering the development of “standards and protocols for cre-
ation of an open architecture data repository to improve SSA
data interoperability and enable greater SSA data sharing” [1].
While significant technical and regulatory progress will be
necessary to develop an operational STM system, the viability
of any such system will hinge on its ability to facilitate most
of the necessary synchronization and planning at an automated
machine to machine (M2M) level.
NASA Ames Research Center (ARC) proposes an STM
system architecture and concept of operations based on API-
defined interfaces between data and service suppliers, con-
sumers of STM services, and regulators within a broader
U.S. STM ecosystem. Critically, the well-defined interfaces
between the different entities enables the application of auton-
omy to problems that have historically required significant hu-
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man participation, due to either the need for manual interfaces
between actors or existence of unsupported non-standard inter-
actions. This paper presents several STM-related system char-
acteristics that might complicate automation, briefly proposes
a conceptual STM architecture and applies it to an example
collision avoidance case, discusses potential roles for system-
wide autonomy within STM, and describes initial thinking on
ways to address the challenges to autonomy identified. NASA
ARC is developing a software-based research platform that
will allow for testing of these strategies and refinement of the
proposed system concept of operation.
II. CHALLENGES FOR STM AUTONOMY
There are several dimensions of the STM architecture,
which challenge the application of system autonomy.
A. The STM system must accommodate safe operations in the
presence of non-participants
An STM system will need to be designed to accommodate
non-participating spacecraft, either those from outside the
jurisdiction of the STM system or who refuse to participate.
International law affirms the right of all countries to use
space, and even if policy-makers choose to open a proposed
U.S. system to other nations on a voluntary basis, the U.S.
would lack any legal authority to mandate participation.
Meanwhile, existing spacecraft will need to deconflict with
non-participants to avoid collisions. Similarly, while civil and
commercial spacecraft may comply with an STM system,
national security entities will be extraordinarily reluctant to
disclose the positions or maneuvering of their unacknowledged
spacecraft. While conjunctions between participating and non-
participating spacecraft cannot be addressed using the STM
system, standards could be developed to encourage informa-
tion sharing.
B. The STM system must allow owner/operators (O/Os) to
maintain operational control over their spacecraft
To be politically palatable, an STM system cannot compel
O/Os to cede operational control of their spacecraft to space
traffic management service suppliers (S3s)1 or a government
entity. While some, particularly small O/Os, may be willing
to do so, the system will need to be designed to accommodate
1The S3 concept is discussed further as part of the our proposed STM
architecture in Section III. S3s serve as a link between O/Os and the rest
of the STM system, providing services such as conjunction assessment and
collision avoidance manuever development.
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negotiations between O/Os and S3s and failure modes if an
O/O does not perform a maneuver correctly or refuses to do
so. In practice, the split of responsibilities between an S3 and
O/O may vary based on the S3 and O/O. For instance, while a
low sophistication O/O might only want to maintain a go/no-
go determination on potential collision avoidance maneuvers, a
sophisticated operation might prefer to review and sometimes
counter-propose collision avoidance maneuvers to its S3.
C. The STM system must tolerate imperfect and private data
Non-cooperative optical and radio-based measurement tech-
niques used to locate and characterize space objects can
determine object positions and enable propagation to future
trajectories. However, they have limited predictive accuracy
and cannot predict or assess maneuvers, particularly long-term
low-thrust maneuvers like those conducted by satellites using
electric propulsion. O/Os often have much better accuracy
positional information for their own spacecraft than can be
obtained non-cooperatively.
Some O/Os are reluctant to share this O/O ephemeris infor-
mation for proprietary reasons. GEO operators collaborated
to develop a non-profit organization called the Space Data
Association to provide a trusted legal and technical means to
exchange proprietary orbital and radio-frequency information
in a protected setting. With limited willingness to share in-
formation, the STM system must tolerate actors attempting to
deconflict collisions without full information, and potentially
with differing understanding of the states of their own space-
craft and those with which they are attempting to deconflict.
The proposed architecture anticipates the existence of commer-
cial providers of SSA observations who, depending on their
business model, may not be willing to disclose observations
publicly. One potential consequence of both O/O reluctance
to share higher-accuracy positional information and an open
architecture is the presence of multiple competing or separate
catalogs of resident space objects (RSOs). Proposals exist
to achieve high resolution information through mechanisms
other than O/O ephemeris, including through independent
GPS modules [2], but these solutions raise similar proprietary
concerns for O/Os.
III. PROPOSED ARCHITECTURE FOR STM CONCEPT OF
OPERATIONS
NASA ARC is developing a concept for an automated
and distributed space traffic management architecture, drawing
on similar NASA work done to provide traffic management
for small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operating at low
altitudes [3] [4], and adopting the same guiding principle of
”flexibility where possible and structure where necessary”.
Our architecture proposes a strategy to accommodate grow-
ing space traffic volume safely and flexibly, as well as provide
the technical means for a transition of STM authority to a
civilian governmental entity. The architecture envisions an
open-access software platform that connects data and service
suppliers, consumers, and regulators via open and standard
APIs. The platform would build on, rather than replicate
coordination efforts within the SSA ecosystem, using existing
standards for data message formats from organizations like the
Consultative Committee for Space Data Systems (CCSDS),
and wrapping rather than replacing existing integrations. The
system seeks to provide the technical means to shift from a
paradigm of manual integration between a limited number of
major organizations, to one that provides low-friction means
to disseminate and harness diverse, but valuable sources of
STM-relevant information with minimal human intervention.
The architecture is designed to be developed through a
series of technical capability levels (TCLs), beginning with a
focus on safe operations of and interaction with small satellites
in low Earth orbit. As the TCLs advance over time, STM
capabilities would expand to include satellites of all sizes, all
orbits, launch and reentry activities, and additional functions
for radio-frequency interference, space weather, and laser
operation. The system would be developed for U.S. supervised
traffic, but could inform subsequent efforts to develop a more
international system.
Key roles within the system include:
• The Spaceflight Information Management System
(SIMS), which serves as a privileged connector be-
tween national regulatory authorities and STM, gath-
ering information for regulatory purposes or pushing
urgent alerts or orbital constraint information as directed
by regulators. National authorities such as the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), National Telecommunications and
Information Administration (NTIA), Department of State,
NASA or NOAA, are expected to communicate with the
international regulatory authorities, such as International
Telecommunications Union (ITU), Inter-Agency Space
Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) or United Na-
tions Office for Outer Space Affairs (UNOOSA), sepa-
rately.
• Owner/Operators (O/O), who own and fly satellites
participating in the STM architecture.
• STM Service Suppliers (S3), who act as a concierge
providing STM & compliance services to O/Os. S3s serve
as a link to the broader STM ecosystem and procure
services on behalf of O/Os.
• Space Situational Awareness Suppliers (SSA), who are
responsible for acquiring and fusing sensor observations
and cooperative tracking data from O/Os to generate and
maintain a catalog of space objects.
• Conjunction Assessment Suppliers (CAS), who are
responsible for screening objects against SSA catalogs
for potential conjunctions, as well as verifying collision
avoidance maneuvers proposed by S3s.
• Supplemental Data Suppliers (SDS), who provide other
relevant data and services. Examples might include pre-
cision atmospheric modeling data to reduce errors in
spacecraft orbit propagation or space weather warnings.
Each of these roles have associated standard APIs with
required and optional fields. Software written to interface with
Fig. 1. A notional outline of the proposed STM architecture.
one particular organization can be easily reused with little or
no modification to interface with any other performing the
same role. These roles are described in functional terms, but
the STM architecture makes no assumptions about the type of
actor who would provide a given service (government, non-
profit, or commercial) or regarding the separation of roles
across actors. Multiple roles might be fulfilled by a single
conceptual or legal entity. For instance, a large O/O who flies
many satellites might choose to act as its own S3, or contract
with an outside provider. Similarly, a single company might
provide both SSA and CAS services. Space Policy Directive
3 directs that a civilian STM authority should continue to
provide free basic SSA and SSA services, consistent with those
currently provided by U.S. Strategic Command. The proposed
architecture system would accommodate these services, while
also allowing the participation of commercial and non-profit
entities, with varying structures and business/service models.
A white paper describing the architecture and concept of
operations in greater detail is under development. NASA
ARC is developing a software research platform featuring an
implementation of the STM architecture concept to assess test
cases and refine it in partnership with industry and academia.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE STM ARCHITECTURE TO
COLLISION AVOIDANCE
This section walks through an operational example of
a collision avoidance maneuver within the proposed STM
architecture, to exemplify the roles of the various actors
involved within STM2. This example involves a conjunction
and subsequent collision avoidance maneuver between two
active satellites. The first, SpaceCube, is a small satellite
without propulsion operated by the University of Spaceland,
which contracts with Service4Less, Inc., a commercial S3.
The other is SatCom1, operated by SatComCo, which also
serves as its own S3. For the sake of this example, assume
both O/Os have well-known positions for their own satellite.
It is worth nothing that apart from initial setup work, the
complex interactions described in the following occur largely
automatically, via APIs in the STM architecture. Manual
intervention occurs primarily at the O/O level, which holds
the ultimate responsibility for safety.
A. Registration
Prior to the start of the example, U. of Spaceland reg-
istered with Service4Less, providing its contact information
and position and meta-data for SpaceCube. Service4Less then
updated the system-wide STM registry to indicate it provides
S3 services to U. of Spaceland for SpaceCube. At agreed upon
intervals, U. of Spaceland provides updated O/O ephemeris to
Service4Less based on the more precise ranging it has from its
communication with the satellite and/or on-board telemetry.
2This section, and the rest of the paper, discusses collision avoidance
in terms of an active satellite maneuvering to avoid a satellite-on-satellite
collision, because that is the most complex and demanding case. Satellite-
on-debris and debris-on-debris collisions also occur and are more common.
Anytime an actor induces a change in orbit to avoid a potential conjunction,
concerns about causing new conjunctions apply.
B. Conjunction Screening
Service4Less regularly requests conjunction screenings for
SpaceCube from one or more CAS providers. For example, it
contracts with Collision Cruncher Corp. Since U. of Spaceland
does not consider SpaceCube’s orbital parameters to be sensi-
tive, Service4Less provides the O/O ephemeris to get a more
accurate conjunction screening. Collision Cruncher Corp. then
requests an updated catalog from one or more SSAs. For
example, it may screen against SpaceCat, a free catalog
operated by the Department of Commerce. Alternatively, it
may use SpaceCat’s competitor, the Space Service Syndicate,
which is vertically integrated and performs both CAS and
SSA roles. In response to the request from Collision Cruncher
Corp., SpaceCat shares the catalog data derived from the
sensors it owns or contracts to receive data from, as well as any
other up-to-date O/O ephemeris that other S3s have provided
to SpaceCat and marked as releasable. Collision Cruncher
Corp. provides Service4Less with a set of conjunction data
messages (CDMs) for conjunctions between SpaceCube and
other RSOs. The particular parameters for screening are set
either by Collision Cruncher Corp. by default or provided by
Service4Less as part of the request.
Service4Less assesses the received CDMs, determining
what events (if any) merit a potential collision avoidance
maneuver, which can be cleared by analysis, and which
are sufficiently far into the future that they can be safely
monitored while awaiting further information. In our example,
Service4Less determines there is a high interest event (HIE)
between SpaceCube and SatCom1 which merits a collision
avoidance maneuver. Service4Less looks up the S3 for Sat-
Com1, sees that SatComCo acts as both the O/O and S3 for
SatCom1, and sends a warning message with the CDM for the
HIE.
If time permits, either Service4Less or SatComCo could
contact an SSA provider to request tasking of additional
sensors for better covariances associated with the position of
either spacecraft, in case additional observations rule out a
collision or reduce the magnitude required for a maneuver.
Updated orbital information provided by the SSA provider
can be shared with the other S3, based on the terms of
allowed redistribution. In this example, we assume the new
observations confirm that an avoidance maneuver is required.
C. Collision Avoidance
The two S3s, Service4Less and SatComCo then begin
negotiations to determine who will move3. There are many
potential ways to decide which spacecraft will move, based
on factors such as operator preference, cost, risk, random
chance, etc. The decisions are guided by technology and
policy, with implications for system autonomy and conditions
for which human-in-the-loop control is required. With some
3It is possible that the two S3s might disagree if a maneuver is required,
in which case the one who believed it was necessary would maneuver itself.
There may eventually be regulatory standards to guide such decisions, but
here it is assumed that all actions are voluntary.
mechanisms, it may make sense for both providers to gener-
ate their preferred maneuver prior to beginning negotiations,
particularly if there is a temporal dependency relevant to the
negotiations (i.e. SatCom1 could comfortably wait until 8 hrs
before the conjunction to maneuver, but SpaceCube only has
access to drag-based orbital control and would need at least
36 hours to safely avoid a collision if it had to maneuver into
a high drag state).
After exchanging proposed maneuvers and agreeing on a
maneuver (assume by SatCom1), that maneuver would be
validated by a CAS to ensure that it does not result in a
secondary conjunction4 between the two satellites or passive
debris5. The maneuver would (with consent from both S3s)
also be disseminated to the STM system overall to ensure it
does not result in a conjunction with any third-party spacecraft.
This broadcast message may be deliberately fuzzed to decrease
precision, if either O/O had concerns about proprietary sharing
of orbital information. Other S3s would then have a certain pe-
riod of time to indicate concerns with the proposed maneuver,
after which the disseminating SatComCo would assume no
objection. The time period for replies, as well as the epoch for
the proposed maneuver would be included in the disseminated
message.
Either concurrently or subsequently, depending on S3 and
O/O preference or any temporal constraints, O/O SatComCo
will need to approve the maneuver (either autonomously or
at the human level). Once approved, its S3 branch would
disseminate a notice of the planned maneuver and timing to
the broader system. It is also possible that a sophisticated
O/O might counter the maneuver proposed by its own S3,
with an alternative to minimize mission impact or for other
reasons. If the O/O proposes another maneuver, the S3 would
then go through the same process to clear that maneuver
instead. After maneuver completion, there would be another
system-wide message. One or both S3s might task an SSA,
or simply request updated positional information, to verify
the maneuver was performed and the spacecraft are in their
expected positions.
V. ENABLING AUTONOMY WITHIN THE STM
ARCHITECTURE
We describe below a few initial, but representative consider-
ations for leveraging autonomy to make the STM architecture
more structured, efficient, flexible and open. As before, we
continue to use physical collisions to illustrate the consider-
ations, because it produces the most long-standing damage
to the safe use of space. However, the assessment, strategic
deconfliction, and data exchange ideas presented are applicable
to other domains within STM such as radio interference.
4By secondary conjunction, we mean a conjunction that results from
an attempt by one of the two satellites maneuvering to avoid the initial
primary conjunction. The differences between primary, secondary, and tertiary
conjunctions and collisions is discussed further in section VI.
5There is a CCSDS message standard under development for spacecraft
maneuvers. If approved, it would likely be used here.
A. Collision Assessment
Following the identification of conjunctions, considerable
decision-making occurs to assess potential collisions and de-
termine whether a conjunction can be safely disregarded, needs
to be monitored further, or if a collision avoidance maneuver is
necessary. Additional autonomy during each of these phases
would be helpful, initially to rule out easy cases and allow
humans to focus on higher interest events, and eventually to
augment or even surpass human decision-making6.
Depending on the O/O and nature of the conjunction,
there are multiple techniques that can be used to rule out
a collision, with varying levels of computational or analytic
effort required [5, slide 18-28]. Autonomy will contribute to
determining which techniques to apply, and selecting cases
for human observation. S3s also need to decide when to task
additional observations, which can help confirm or rule out
the need for a collision avoidance maneuver, but typically
results in a delay to taking action and may involve a financial
cost. Autonomy could help detect patterns to determine when
additional observations are likely to be helpful, decide between
different possible sensors or observation windows, weigh the
expected benefit of potential observations against the cost of
acquiring them, and if delay will reduce potential avoidance
maneuvers or increase ∆V requirements. Once a maneuver
is determined to be necessary, autonomy could help identify
the best maneuver(s) based on various operator, regulator,
or system-defined characteristics and facilitate negotiation
between S3s during a satellite-on-satellite conjunction.
B. Collision Avoidance - Who Moves?
Setting rules for which operator moves to avoid a high
risk conjunction is beyond the scope of the architecture,
but an important question for an operational system. While,
under certain situations maneuver generation would be handled
exclusively by the S3 of the more private O/O, the maneuver
could potentially be conducted by either spacecraft7. Other
factors that could influence which spacecraft moves include
policy, technical parameters (such as the relative timing of
potential maneuver windows for each craft), whether one O/O
and its S3 trusts the technical competency of the other S3 and
craft to conduct an avoidance maneuver (a large communica-
tions satellite O/O might prefer to move its satellite rather than
trust a university-flown small satellite to correctly maneuver).
A few high level methods to autonomously determine which
satellite should move are described below. Ideally, standards
would be developed by an inclusive group of O/Os and other
stakeholders.
a) Rules-Based System: There would be a set of agreed-
upon right-of-way rules that dictate which O/O should move.
6Large O/Os operate sophisticated flight dynamics teams with rigorous
processes, that may already incorporate some level of autonomy. Further
consultation with such stakeholders, should they be willing to publicly share
their practices, will be invaluable to defining the future direction of this work.
7In practice, we imagine that the more secretive O/O would conduct a
maneuver rather than create a maneuver for the other craft, to avoid sharing
trajectory information and seeking consent from the other S3.
A useful analogy can be drawn from the rules governing
right-of-way for sailboats, which tend to prioritize the less
maneuverable craft, but also include arbitrary prioritization as
necessary —i.e. leeward (downwind) over windward (upwind)
and starboard tack over port tack. Regardless of the rules,
naturally, a craft should still seek to avoid a collision. A
rules-based system needs to be carefully designed to minimize
otherwise counterproductive system-exploiting behavior by
O/Os seeking to externalize the cost of collision avoidance
onto other crafts. A rules-based system also needs widespread
and unified adoption to be successful. It is not self-enforcing
(except to the extent actors see it in their own interest to
comply) and may be of limited effectiveness without any
accompanying method for liability enforcement8.
b) Dual-Maneuver Implicit Cost Split: Both craft would
maneuver in a way that poses an equitable cost in consum-
ables, mission disruption, or some other agreed-upon cost
parameter. The advantage of such an approach is that it
results in an implicit split of cost without requiring mon-
etary transfer or other compensation. It is complicated by
difficulties in quantifying mission disruption and consumable
valuation, need for extensive communication to mutually plan
maneuvers, a larger number of failure modes, and automation
challenges.
c) Auction-Based System: O/Os would offer to move
their craft to avoid a collision for a certain price to be paid
by the other conjuncting craft. The other O/O would be free
to counter-offer another cheaper price, and the bargaining
would continue until a lowest price was reached. Rates could
potentially go up if new observational information changed
the situational awareness of either operator. This system can
be automated with relative ease. It would ensure that the
craft with the lower cost of avoidance would maneuver and
be compensated. In the absence of other policy enforcement
mechanisms, small craft could potentially extract rents by pric-
ing avoidance at an amount just below the cost of avoidance
for large satellites, and risks incentivizing collision-seeking
behavior by small maneuverable spacecraft against large risk-
averse operations. Operationally, it would implicitly favor
richer operators, and may be problematic if a conjunction
occurs between satellites overseen by states that do not permit
financial transactions between their respective citizens, or that
have sanctioned a particular operator.
d) Resource-based System: The operator who would
experience a lower cost of avoidance should conduct the ma-
neuver. Cost could be assessed in terms of propellant usage, fi-
nancial cost, or other mechanisms. If successful, this approach
ensures the minimum total cost of mitigation. Challenges
include ensuring accurate cost signaling by owner/operators,
agreeing on cost definition, and the fact that such a system
considers a lower absolute cost of movement, but not the
significance of that cost to the operator (as a fraction of their
8Space liability is an interesting and complex topic in international space
law, but is largely unsettled due to limited precedent.
budget). It may also be difficult to equate cost metrics across
very different types of satellites, and challenging to automate.
e) Last-Minute: Both crafts continue on their trajectories,
in spite of being aware of an impending conjunction, until
one decides to maneuver and notifies the other. While simple
and self-enforcing, it is disadvantageous to the more risk-
averse operators, and increases the likelihood of late or no
mitigation maneuvers. It may also increase consumable cost
by encouraging operators and their S3s to wait until closer
to a potential conjunction to move (in hopes the other craft
will move), increasing the ∆V cost of their ultimate maneuver
compared to if they had acted earlier. While last-minute
avoidance might evolve in the absence of another system, it
is not a system that policy-makers or operators should seek to
promote.
C. Catalogs - Centralized vs. Distributed?
A basic architectural question with profound system con-
sequences and implications for autonomy mechanisms is
whether the architecture should have a single authoritative
master catalog of space objects, or if it should support multiple
non-authoritative catalogs. In case of the former, the supplier
of that catalog would be responsible for ingesting, filtering,
and deconflicting between multiple sources of potentially
contradictory information. In case of the latter, they contain
incomplete or differing information about object locations,
with potential complications for conjunction screening and
collision avoidance if the S3s involved are relying on different
(and limited) sets of information9. For the sake of defining the
architecture, it is not necessary to define who will develop,
own, and/or operate the catalog(s). Options might include
government entities, private contractors to government, com-
panies, non-profit associations, and international organizations.
There at least four possible permutations of catalog archi-
tecture including a (1) single authoritative catalog (similar to
U.S. air traffic control and UTM), (2) a small N number of
high quality catalogs (with N small enough for CAS providers,
S3s, and O/Os to manually or semi-manually decide to use a
particular catalog and incorporate it into their workflow), (3) a
large N number of catalogs (where verification and validation
would need to be automated or mostly-automated), or (4) a
small N or large N set of catalogs combined with algorithms
to develop a single decentralized consensus.
1) Single Authoritative Catalog: With a one catalog ap-
proach, a single body within the architecture would be re-
sponsible for maintaining a catalog of RSOs. It would choose
how to incorporate various sources of SSA information and
fuse that data into a single cohesive picture of the orbital
environment. The catalog custodian could be subject to various
forms of oversight, depending on the type of owner (commer-
9It is also important to note that at an architectural level, the decision to
have one or multiple catalogs is separate from the question of what SSA
sources catalog(s) should ingest data from, or what SSA products should be
derived from that data.
cial, government, or non-profit)10. The Analytical Graphics,
Inc. (AGI) Center for Space Standards and Innovation argues
that existing catalog information is insufficiently accurate or
precise to provide a basis for actionable SSA and STM across
all relevant orbits [6, p. 7-10].
A one catalog approach has several key advantages. Because
data is verified and validated at catalog ingestion, there is
largely one set of truth about what objects are in orbit, where
they are, and who owns them11. Rather than S3s and CASs
being tasked with SSA source curation, validation, and data
fusion, it would be done by the catalog. Having one source
of truth simplifies maneuver coordination and helps avoid
scenarios where different satellite O/Os make maneuvers based
on different spatio-temporal understandings that either result
in an unforeseen collision, or produce a collision with a third
party operating with a different spatio-temporal understanding.
Having a single catalog at an actionable level of accuracy
is arguably also a prerequisite for any kind of government-
mandated control (as opposed to a S3 and O/O coordination
mandate). The lack of a single unified understanding increases
risk for S3s, who might then seek or require some form of
indemnification from their customers or government, which in
turn encourages laxer practices by S3s interested in catering
to less risk-averse O/Os.
On the other hand, having one catalog limits recourse if that
catalog does not perform at the level desired by stakeholders,
who will be limited in their ability to push improvements
to that system or develop sustainable alternatives. Similarly,
various stakeholders may have different, somewhat incompat-
ible requirements for the system, and a single catalog may
not meet all needs. This may particularly be a concern if the
system operates with a funding model that passes costs through
either directly to O/Os or S3s who serve them. Some O/Os
may require and being willing to pay for exquisite positional
accuracy due to operating expensive spacecraft in congested
orbits, while others would be satisfied with relatively coarse
information to avoid gross collision risk at minimal cost. It also
means that the catalog custodian, subject to whatever checks
are put in place, would make decisions about which sources
of SSA data to procure, potentially including commercial
decisions about what data to purchase at what prices. This may
result in a commercial conflict of interest if some SSA sources
are operated by the catalog provider while others would need
to be purchased from the operator’s commercial competitors.
A single system would also need to tailor clear rules for access,
acceptable use, and information sharing. It would either need
to provide SSA products adequate to meet the needs of all
10A commercial entity could be regulated similar to other natural mo-
nopolies such as utility companies, a government body would be subject to
administrative procedure requirements, as well as agency and congressional
oversight, and a non-profit would be subject to management by a board of
key stakeholders.
11There will likely always be operators unwilling to cooperatively share
data with the catalog, either for commercial competition or national security
reasons. The catalog would need to develop ways to interact with these entities
and decide how much information to provide to them, in what formats, and
with what conditions of use.
users, or have acceptable procedures to provide information
to third parties, without losing the trust of O/Os sharing their
sensitive, proprietary information. From a cybersecurity risk
perspective, a single system presents a single target and point
of failure, should that system be compromised. While in the
case of a short, rapidly detected breach, specific positional
information would only be of limited use (as propagation
errors diverge), there is a significant proprietary risk if satellite
geometry, maneuver planning, and spectrum/RF information is
compromised.
2) Small N Number of Catalogs: The current de facto state
of STM is a small N set of catalogs, with various providers
seeking to differentiate themselves and their offerings from the
free Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC) catalog and con-
junction warnings12. A small N number of catalogs provides
greater flexibility and accountability than a single authoritative
catalog, but still allows for a manual or semi-manual assess-
ment and interface between the catalogs, stakeholders who
would provide data to the system, and downstream users of
the systems. Multiple catalogs with overlapping RSO coverage
derived from different sensor networks could also potentially
provide a robust mechanism for cross-validation of data qual-
ity. A small N set of catalogs is an inevitable consequence
if catalog operators design their catalogs with only capability
to ingest data from a limited number or type of source. A
small N is distinguished from a large N because when N
becomes sufficiently large, it will require standardized, off-the-
shelf, interoperable interfaces with autonomous integration of
quality-assessed SSA data. Large N offers operators additional
flexibility, choice, and reduced transaction costs associated
with discovering, assessing, validating, verifying, fusing, and
negotiating for access to each catalog, at a greater initial cost
in ensuring interoperability and automation.
Existing non-government providers include AGI, ExoAna-
lytic, LeoLabs, and the Space Data Association, each of which
also integrates aspects of SSA collection and conjunction
analysis. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no third-party
certification of these catalogs, rather individual customers
evaluate their offerings and make decisions regarding which,
if any, to incorporate into their collision avoidance and other
SSA analysis. It is useful to again draw a distinction between
non-cooperative data, which generally can be widely shared
subject to only commercial concerns, and operator-furnished
maneuver or meta-data, which is critical for accurate modeling
and prediction, but where proprietary concerns can in many
cases prevent consent for public dissemination.
The small N approach is compatible with a regulatory
scheme that attributes responsibility for collision avoidance to
O/Os or S3s, without attempting to influence risk tolerance,
but works less well if the regulatory scheme attempts to
compel greater risk-aversion among risk-tolerant operators. If
an operator has a choice among multiple catalogs, it may
simply choose the cheapest one (or the cheapest S3, which
12Even though multiple catalogs and providers exist, JSpOC is by far the
most dominant provider of SSA information, especially in LEO.
draws on the cheapest catalog), or potentially cherry pick
between catalogs to find data that shows its satellite will not
collide.
Multiple catalogs also increase complexity of collision
avoidance maneuver coordination, since S3s will need to
deconflict state information for the spacecraft in question, as
well as potentially impacted third-party spacecraft, to screen
for maneuver induced conjunctions. The most accurate or-
bital determinations require cooperative maneuver information
from O/Os, and providing this information to more than one
trusted third party expands the required trust envelope. If
only one catalog receives this operator-furnished information,
and others simply provide additional non-cooperative tracking,
the situation becomes similar to the one catalog case, as the
catalog with operator-furnished information will simply need
to come to agreements to ingest observations from the other
catalogs (since O/Os may be sharing-averse).
3) Large N Number of Catalogs: A large N number of
catalogs envisions multiple catalogs, where N is so large
that it is not feasible for S3s or O/Os to independently or
manually devote effort to interfacing with particular catalogs
or assessing the quality of the data provided. Instead, interfaces
would need to be highly standardized and operators would
need to develop robust and autonomous verification and value
determination algorithms to evaluate potential sources of data
and choose which to ingest. The large N case features greater
initial technical complexity, but results in a market with
reduced switching and transaction costs, where S3s and CASs
interface with catalogs as a main feature in building their SSA.
Market forces would result in significant competition among
catalog providers and keep prices low, at least so long as the
market does not tend toward consolidation to become a natural
monopoly.
The large N case is characterized by significant difficulty
in maneuver coordination and determining how to handle
sensitive data from providers. The secure multiparty computa-
tion cryptographic technique referenced in the next subsection
might provide a way to share sensitive state information for
the purpose of conjunction analysis, without revealing the
underlying information.
4) N Number of Catalogs with Algorithmic Consensus:
This option conceptualizes the creation of a consensus meta-
catalog among multiple catalogs (small or large N) in a robust
and distributed manner. Catalogs would share their information
about RSOs, and an autonomous algorithm would pool data,
resolve conflicts (i.e. where catalogs place objects in mutually
inconsistent orbits), and determine positional, ephemeris, and
covariance information for each object. The advantage of this
approach is that it can allow the development of a single
authoritative catalog, with associated benefits for collision
avoidance maneuver coordination, without requiring a single
organizational catalog.
There would be multiple challenges for developing such a
system, the first being if it is achievable and robust from a
technical perspective. An algorithm would need to meet very
high standards for reliability and security, and probably be able
to autonomously identify and reject deliberately harmful infor-
mation submitted by catalogs. The second relates to sharing of
proprietary O/O information necessary to produce the meta-
catalog. Multiparty computation (MPC) provides a mechanism
to securely share inputs for computations in a way that shields
the inputs from other parties, while publicly disclosing and
confirming the result of a computation. MPC may provide
a useful technique for such a meta-catalog, but challenges
associated with computational complexity remain [7]. Third,
funding allocation is tricky, but solvable. The meta-catalog
would need to provide a mechanism to apportion funding
for contributing catalogs under an algorithmic system. Since
data is automatically contributed, S3s and O/Os would no
longer make funding decisions. Instead, we need an algorithm
that weighs the value of the contributions, perhaps based on
usefulness for collision detection or number of observations, or
accuracy against a randomly selected and exquisitely known
set of objects. The authors are not certain if an algorithmic
consensus mechanism is technically feasible, but include it
for future consideration.
VI. ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES OF STM AUTONOMY
APPLIED TO COLLISION AVOIDANCE
The current state of SSA is a small N number of catalogs.
Evolution to a single catalog or N catalogs with consensus (be-
having like an integrated catalog) may eventually be desirable,
but is premature until SSA information & sensors, data product
needs, and derived SSA product generation methods solidify
to a level that data can be pooled to meet the needs of S3s &
O/Os for actionable information. In the meanwhile, designing
a method that permits feasible system-wide deconfliction of
potential conjunctions within a multi-catalog architecture is
necessary, because collision avoidance is a non-negotiable
requirement for an STM system. This section explores the
considerations of operating such a system as algorithmically
and autonomously as possible. The software research platform
proposed for development at NASA ARC will be critical to
assessing the feasibility of these concepts.
A. Conceptualizing Types of Conjunctions
When an active satellite moves to avoid a potential conjunc-
tion, it is acting to mitigate three potential sets of conjunctions:
the primary conjunction that motivated the maneuver, any
secondary conjunctions between the manuevering satellite
and the object included in the initial conjunction, and any
tertiary conjunctions between the maneuvering satellite and
other RSOs. While secondary and tertiary conjunctions will
likely only be screened for some limited time period into
the future (subject to limits in orbit propagation accuracy),
the maneuver will not be fully successful if it does not clear
all three sets of conjunction constraints over this time period,
thereby requiring another maneuver shortly thereafter.
B. Collision Avoidance Scenarios as a Function of Data
Availability
Before discussing strategies for collision avoidance with
multiple catalogs, it is important to note what data each S3 will
have and what data is not necessarily shared. All operators will
have access to the free catalog of government-provided SSA
information, primarily derived from non-cooperative observa-
tions from the Space Surveillance Network, but potentially
also from O/O ephemerides when those O/Os have consented
to publication, or from commercial or other SSA observations
purchased by or donated to the government SSA catalog. There
may also be non-cooperative observations from commercial
or private sources, that may be shared with a limited set
of users or not shared at all. Some level of filtering may
be necessary to determine if observations from a particular
source are in conflict with another, or to generate collision
avoidance maneuvers based on a worst case scenario, or that
avoid multiple possible conjunction paths for secretive or
indeterminate SSA.
Differences between non-cooperative observations and O/O
ephemeris information can be very substantial, especially if a
non-cooperative orbit is propagated based on a pre-maneuver
or mid-maneuver observation. The architecture assumes and
exploits the fact that the S3 representing a particular O/O
will have access to this information, and will know its orbit
authoritatively and correctly, even if it differs from non-
cooperative observations. It further assumes that S3s and
O/Os are incentivized to avoid collisions and will act accord-
ingly, even if they are subject to limitations on sharing O/O
ephemerides.
A successful strategy for system-wide collision avoidance
needs to address several scenarios: (1) when accurate posi-
tions of both spacecraft are known to both S3s, (2) When
accurate information for one satellite is known to both O/Os,
but accurate information for the other is only known to its
own O/O (and the first does not necessarily know it has an
inaccurate trajectory for the second), (3) When both operators
have known states for their own spacecraft, but inaccurate
information for the other spacecraft (neither necessarily knows
this).
There can also be variation in the level of divergence
between the information known to the S3 representing an O/O
and that available to the other S3 from SSA provider(s). In
the case of a small divergence, resulting from routine station-
keeping maneuvers, a sufficiently sized screening volume
during conjunction screening may be sufficient to accommo-
date the error. In the case of a larger maneuver, where an
inclusive screening volume is large enough to produce an
unacceptable number of false positives, only the S3 and O/O,
or SSA/CAS providers who they have shared information with,
will have the potential to accurately screen for conjunctions.
Since at least some S3s and O/Os will be unwilling to fully
share this information, the architecture must rely on them to
perform conjunction analysis in the case of a large maneuver,
and disseminate an authoritative conjunction assessment. In
the rare case where two spacecraft both engage in large
maneuvers simultaneously, there is no way (to the authors’
knowledge) to ensure a collision is avoided without at least
one of them sharing positional information with the other,
with sufficient resolution to rule out a conjunction (but not
necessarily to precisely describe its own position). Information
could potentially be shared as an input to a secure MPC to
enable screening without revealing the underlying trajectory
information. Such computations involve significantly increased
time and resources as compared to non-encrypted techniques,
and may only be viable in the case of pre-identified areas of
concern, rather than allowing all against all screening in the
case of large maneuvers.
C. Levels of Data Sharing
O/Os vary in their willingness to share ephemeris informa-
tion. One can imagine a (non-exhaustive) scale of comfort in
sharing such information. The scale below ranges from most
open to least open to sharing. It is meant to be conceptual
to help address information needs in the context of mitigating
primary, secondary, and tertiary conjunctions. Interviews and
other engagement with existing O/Os would be necessary to
better understand and categorize the willingness of actual O/Os
to share orbital information. In the absence of O/O provided
data, S3s and other actors in the STM system have to fall back
on surveillance (non-cooperative) measurements.
• Level 5 - Global publication of orbital information:
O/Os are willing to publish ephemeris information to the
STM system regularly for use by others and ingestion
into any SSA that chooses to use the data.
• Level 4 - Legal protected/trusted environment: O/O
are willing to publish ephemeris information, but only
within the context of an environment that places legal and
technical restrictions on use, to address the O/O’s con-
cerns about competitive advantage or other consequences
of sharing.
• Level 3 - Particularized data for a certain conjunction:
O/O is willing to provide information for limited period
of time, upon request, in order to screen or clear a
particular conjunction, but is unwilling to provide more
general access to such information. It may insist on the
use of MPC to minimize data disclosure.
• Level 2 - Confirm or deny a threat of potential
collision: some O/Os may be unwilling to provide even
limited orbital information, but might be willing to screen
a requester’s spacecraft orbit against their known data,
and either confirm or rule out the need for action.
• Level 1 - No sharing: Some O/O may be unwilling to
share O/O ephemeris information in the absence of legal
compulsion to do so.
D. Automating Collision Avoidance with Varying Data and
Multiple Catalogs
Actors in the system should use the best accuracy data
available to them, and policy-makers may wish to put in place
incentives to encourage greater data sharing. Even if the STM
architecture would be able to avoid a conjunction with more
limited data, more data may help reduce false positives, or
conserve propellant for required maneuvers. The following
items describe informational needs, and possible strategies at
each step in the collision avoidance chain.
a) Initial Screening for Potential Conjunctions: CASs
generate a list of conjunctions using the best information
available to them. Screening parameters should be set gener-
ously enough to not require O/O-shared ephemeris data to flag
potential conjunctions. This is possible with no O/O sharing
but enhanced by O/O data. Since large maneuvers are not
known to the system, initial screening cannot address them
without CAS access to maneuver information.
b) Collision Assessment: The S3 would review the po-
tential CDMs, autonomously determining (1) when it would be
necessary to act on each of them, (2) when to task additional
sensors to observe potential threats, (3) what constitutes a
threat that requires warning of the other S3, (4) when to
generate collision avoidance maneuvers, (5) what those ma-
neuvers should be, and (6) at what point in this process should
humans be brought into the loop and when these steps can be
automated. As described previously, this decision chain is one
of the major components where autonomy will be critical to
enabling the STM architecture.
c) Primary Conjunction Mitigation: Both S3s need to
understand the trajectory of the other spacecraft well enough
to determine if there is an unacceptable risk of collision.
Following up on the generalized screening conducted by the
CAS, the S3s would contact each other in an attempt to verify
their understandings of the trajectory of both spacecraft13, and
best estimate the time of closest approach. If only one of the
two S3s assesses that there is a risk of collision, it would then
unilaterally direct its spacecraft to be the one that moved, but
would still share as much data as it was willing to disclose.
d) Secondary Conjunction Mitigation: Either both op-
erators need to know the position of the other craft with
sufficient accuracy to ensure that a secondary conjunction
does not occur, or both operators need to trust one of the
S3s to conduct coordination on behalf of both spacecraft. If
only one spacecraft moves to avoid a potential conjunction,
both S3s trust the S3 of the moving spacecraft, by default.
If the position of spacecraft A is well known by both S3s,
level 2 information sharing may be sufficient, with the S3 of
Spacecraft B either clearing a maneuver proposed by the S3
of Spacecraft A, or simply confirming to the S3 of Spacecraft
A that it will maneuver in a way to clear the conjunction and
that Spacecraft A should maintain its existing or an agreed-
upon trajectory. If neither S3 has well characterized positional
information for the other craft, either larger margins will be
necessary to avoid a collision or at least level 3 information
sharing is required (perhaps using MPC).
e) Tertiary Conjunction Mitigation: The key distinguish-
ing fact about tertiary conjunction mitigation is that the ma-
neuvering craft does not know with which potential operators
13This verification process is limited by willingness to share information.
Both S3s could declare their willingness to share information. If both S3s
are willing to share positional information, they can simply conduct an open
comparison to verify their mutual positional understanding. If unacceptable
to one party but acceptable to the other, the more private O/O’s S3 could
take responsibility for collision assessment and avoidance without necessarily
revealing its own orbit ephemeris. If both demand restrictions, collision
assessment would default to using MPC or a mutually trusted third-party.
it might enter into a conjunction (due to differences between
the information its S3 has and that held privately by other
actors). The S3 for the maneuvering object would check the
proposed maneuver against the best SSA information available
to it about all RSOs. This would clear most objects, but not
those of maneuvering satellites with undisclosed ephemeris. If
the maneuvering O/O is willing to share its planned trajectory
globally (level 5), it can simply declare a planned maneuver to
the full system and wait for any objections (as in the example
in section IV), which places the burden for screening the
proposed maneuver on those S3s who represent O/Os unwill-
ing to share O/O ephemeris information. If the maneuvering
O/O is unwilling to provide exquisite orbital information,
it could provide a deliberately fuzzy track, and engage in
follow-up one-on-one deconflictions with any other O/Os that
declare a potential conjunction with that track, potentially
again using MPC. If it is unwilling to share any information
(level 1), and the primary maneuver is small, it may simply
be captured within existing conjunction screening margins by
other operators. If the primary maneuver is large, and the O/O
is unwilling to declare it, it is difficult for the STM system to
assure tertiary non-conjunction. A subset of undeclared large
maneuvers could be cleared by placing bounding assumptions
on the movement of third party satellites (i.e. it would be
physically impossible for this craft to maneuver into an orbit
that would produce a conjunction with my satellite’s new
trajectory). Unfortunately, the subset that can be cleared is also
the subset least likely to pose a risk of conjunction. Clearing
the remaining conjunctions of concern would require access to
O/O ephemeris or other exquisite orbital trajectory information
for those spacecraft.
E. What About Non-Participants?
At each of these steps, participating S3s will only be able
to avoid non-participants of which they or their SSA providers
have accurate knowledge. The system does envision a public
API to allow non-participants to access the STM architecture,
subject to limitations as necessary, for research, reporting,
development of new products, or for non-participant use.
Oltrogge describes a category of ”Willing Non-Contributor
Operators (WNCOs)” who are interested in preventing col-
lisions, but are unwilling to provide data into an STM system
(whether for commercial, national security, or other reasons
[6, p. 17]. In our proposed architecture, these entities would
maintain an obligation to avoid collisions, including with
maneuvering spacecraft. A risk exists for collision between
maneuvering spacecraft unwilling to disclose their locations
and WNCOs, but these conjunctions would by definition need
to be handled outside the system.
Investigation using the STM software research platform
would inform what constitutes a typical threshold for a small
vs. large maneuver, how much of a threat exists for potential
collision between two maneuvering spacecraft, and if policy
mandating the disclosure of large maneuvers is necessary
to provide assurance of orbital deconfliction in an open-
architecture STM system.
VII. NEXT STEPS AND WAYS TO PARTICIPATE
As a next step, the NASA STM group plans to continue
presenting the proposed architecture to potential stakeholders
to further refine the concept. Once the concept has been
matured and stabilized, work will begin to define APIs, roles,
and functions, as well as the details of the varying technology
capability levels. Concurrent with the definition work, we have
begun on work to develop the software research platform,
as well as set up a physical laboratory and visualization
environment at the NASA Ames Research Center. The team
also plans to develop and test tools for automating of various
components of conjunction assessment, building on both pre-
developed in-house code [8] and existing tools such as AGI’s
STK AdvCAT module and the European Space Agency’s
DRAMA tool. The team actively invites feedback from O/Os
and other STM stakeholders to help inform the proposed STM
architecture, and to collaborate in the development and testing
of the proposed software research platform.
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